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COMMENT 
―TILL DEATH (OR DOMA) DOES US PART‖:  
HOW DOMA IMPOSES AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
CLASSIFYING AND COERCIVE CONDITION ON FEDERAL 
FUNDING IN THE WAKE OF MASSACHUSETTS V. UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
 
Erin Bender* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are employed by the Massachusetts Department of 
Veterans‘ Services (―DVS‖) as one of many staff members responsible for 
administering federal funding received from the United States Department 
of Veterans Affairs (―VA‖) for the administration of the two veterans‘ 
cemeteries within Massachusetts.  These cemeteries are strictly used for the 
burial of veterans, their spouses, and their children.  As part of your 
position, you review applications for burial submitted by Massachusetts 
residents to determine if the applicants are eligible for burial in one of the 
two cemeteries.  However, Massachusetts‘ receipt of this funding is 
conditioned on its compliance with all the regulations promulgated by the 
Secretary of the VA. 
Currently on your desk is an application submitted by Jane and Rhonda 
Smith.  Jane and Rhonda have been in a valid marriage (under 
Massachusetts law) since 2005.  Jane is a retired United States Army 
lieutenant who honorably served ten years in South Korea, seven years in 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, Randolph-Macon College 
1. The example above, while fictional, is based on one of the factual situations presented by the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts as reason to find DOMA unconstitutional in Massachusetts v. U.S. 
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Guam, three years in Germany, and a year in Kuwait during Operation Gulf 
Storm.  She is highly decorated, having earned two Army Commendation 
Medals, three Bronze Stars, and six Good Conduct Medals.  Jane‘s wife 
Rhonda did not serve in a branch of the military but wishes to be buried 
with her spouse.  According to Massachusetts, Jane and Rhonda are validly 
married and, therefore, you should be able to approve their application with 
ease.  However, there is one problem—the VA has informed DVS that, 
according to the federal definition of marriage under the Defense of 
Marriage Act (―DOMA‖), VA is entitled to recapture any federal funds if 
DVS should decide to bury a non-independently eligible same-sex spouse 
of a veteran in the cemetery.   You must make a choice: (1) either grant 
Jane and Rhonda‘s application and risk having DVS lose federal grant 
money provided by the VA for maintenance of the military cemeteries, or 
(2) deny Jane and Rhonda‘s application and, effectively, refuse to honor the 
validity of their marriage under Massachusetts law.1 
Current Spending Clause jurisprudence provides that Congress can 
attempt to obtain objectives not within its Article I enumerated powers 
―through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal 
funds.‖2  However, this power is not unlimited; instead, the Supreme Court 
has recognized four limitations imposed upon congressional spending 
power.3  One of these is that ―other constitutional provisions may provide 
an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds.‖4  
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court‘s current interpretation of the Spending 
Clause falls short because it allows Congress to coerce states into accepting 
federal funding in areas where Congress could not directly commandeer the 
states and state officials.5  This Note suggests that the Court adopt a new 
test that would look at a condition attached to federal funding and 
determine whether it is a classifying condition or a coercive condition.6  
Under this new test, a classifying condition will be deemed constitutional 
unless it violates equal protection principles; a coercive condition, on the 
other hand, will usually implicate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.7 
 
1. The example above, while fictional, is based on one of the factual situations presented by the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts as reason to find DOMA unconstitutional in Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241(D. Mass. 2010). 
2. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
3. Id. at 207–08. 
4. Id. at 208. 
5. Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Is Marriage Reserved to the 
States?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419, 457–58 (1999). 
6. E.g., Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
1103, 1114 (1987). 
7. Id. at 1116. 
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On July 8, 2010, in Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health 
and Human Services, Judge Tauro of the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts granted Massachusetts‘ motion for summary 
judgment by determining that Section Three of DOMA, as applied to 
Massachusetts, violates the Tenth Amendment and Congress‘ power under 
the Spending Clause.8  According to Judge Tauro, Section Three violates 
Congress‘ power under the Spending Clause by ―induc[ing] 
[Massachusetts] to violate the equal protection rights of its citizens‖ in 
order to receive federal funding such as that provided by the VA to 
maintain state veterans‘ cemeteries.9  The Federal Government has appealed 
Judge Tauro‘s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit,10 and the Supreme Court will most likely grant certiorari to the 
appellate decision.  Therefore, Massachusetts presents an opportunity for 
the Court to reconsider its Spending Clause jurisprudence and adopt this 
new test for unconstitutional conditions. 
Part II of this Note provides a short legislative history of DOMA and an 
overview of Spending Clause jurisprudence.  Part III provides an overview 
of Judge Tauro‘s opinion in Massachusetts.  Finally, Part IV of this Note 
analyzes Section Three of DOMA under the proposed classifying/coercive 
condition approach to the Spending Clause and concludes that Section 
Three of DOMA would be unconstitutional as either type of condition. 
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND SPENDING: AN OVERVIEW OF DOMA AND 
SPENDING CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. A Brief History of DOMA‘s Enactment 
As early as 1890, the Supreme Court recognized that the ―whole subject 
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to 
the laws of the States, and not to the law of the United States.‖11  Therefore, 
because no established body of federal domestic relations law exists, when 
determining who can receive federal benefits under a federal statute, the 
federal government will defer to state laws regarding domestic relations 
―unless Congress clearly mandates otherwise.‖12  Essentially, Section Three 
of DOMA purports to displace this practice of deferring to state law by 
 
8. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (D. Mass. 2010). 
9. Id. at 248 (alterations in original). 
10. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), 
appeal docketed, No. 10–2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 2010). 
11. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890). 
12. MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 149 (1997). 
  
614 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIV:4 
establishing a federal definition of marriage.13  In order to understand why 
the 104th Congress determined it necessary to establish a federal definition 
of marriage, one must look to the events occurring in Hawaii during the 
early 1990s. 
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined that sex is a suspect 
category for equal protection purposes and that Hawaii‘s marriage statute 
limiting marriage to one man and one woman is unconstitutional, unless the 
state could show ―that (a) the statute‘s sex-based classification is justified 
by compelling state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgments of . . . constitutional rights.‖14  Three years later, 
and fearful that recognition of same-sex marriage was ―imminent‖ in 
Hawaii, Congress enacted DOMA,15 whereupon President Clinton signed it 
into law on September 21, 1996.16  Section Three of DOMA provides: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies 
of the United States, the word ―marriage‖ means only a legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ―spouse‖ refers 
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.17 
The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives (―Judiciary 
Committee‖) claimed that four governmental interests were advanced by 
the passage of DOMA: ―(1) defending and nurturing the institution of 
traditional, heterosexual marriage; (2) defending traditional notions of 
morality; (3) protecting state sovereignty and democratic self-governance; 
and (4) preserving scarce government resources.‖18  Members of the 104th 
 
13. See generally Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) 
(codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). 
14. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).  The Hawaii Supreme Court determined the trial 
court erred in granting Lewin‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing the plaintiffs‘ 
complaint.  Id. at 68.  The court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the 
state could overcome the presumption that its marriage statute is unconstitutional.  Id. 
15. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES 116–17 (2006).  However, according to the 
dissenting legislators on the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, recognition of same-
sex marriage was not imminent in Hawaii because the trial court was not scheduled to start hearing the 
remanded case until September of 2006.  H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 36 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2939.  Therefore, the dissenters stressed that there was ―plenty of time to legislate 
with more thought and analysis.‖  Id.  In a somewhat ironic twist, Hawaii voters, one year after DOMA 
was enacted, voted to amend Hawaii‘s constitution so that the Hawaiian ―legislature shall have the 
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.‖  HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
16. See Whitten, supra note 5, at 440. 
17. Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 110 Stat. at 2419. 
18. H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 12, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2916.  Arguably, the fourth 
governmental interest advanced by the committee—preserving scarce government resources—seems to 
be the one that would be most considered in a constitutional challenge of DOMA relying on the 
Spending Clause.  According to the Judiciary Committee, the Federal Government ―currently provides 
an array of material and other benefits to married couples in an effort to promote, protect, and prefer the 
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Congress believed that recognition of same-sex marriages by Hawaii would 
also have ―profound implications for federal law‖ because the word 
―marriage‖ appears in over 800 federal statutes and regulations and the 
word spouse appears over 3,100 times.19  Before the ―dawn‖ of same-sex 
marriages, the Federal Government simply relied on state law marriage 
definitions because there was no federal definition of marriage.20  Overall, 
the Judiciary Committee believed that the federal definition of marriage set 
forth in Section Three of DOMA only constituted a ―narrow federal 
requirement‖ and that the ―federal government [would] continue to 
determine marital status in the same manner it does under current law.‖21  
Essentially, Section Three of DOMA codifies Congress‘ intent to prohibit 
same-sex couples from receiving federal benefits conditioned on marital 
status.22 
B. A Brief Overview of Spending Clause Jurisprudence 
The Constitution allows Congress to ―provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare of the United States.‖23  From this clause, commonly 
referred to as the Spending Clause, derives Congress‘ spending power.  
―Much of federal policy is implemented through spending legislation, 
which disburses funds to states upon certain conditions.‖24  The following is 
an overview of two of the seminal Supreme Court cases determining 
whether Congress can attach conditions to money provided to the states. 
―[N]ot surprisingly, challenges to the spending power came soon after 
Congress began enacting social programs.‖25  In 1936, the Court considered 
whether provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (―AAA‖) 
violated the Constitution.26  According to the Court, the provision of the 
AAA authorizing the expenditure of funds raised by a processing tax on 
 
institution of marriage.‖  H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 18, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2922.  
Therefore, the Judiciary Committee seems to imply that Congress can condition the provision of benefits 
to married couples on states‘ compliance with DOMA‘s federal definition of marriage. 
19. H.R. REP. NO. 104–664, at 10, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2914. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 31, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2935 (alteration in original). 
22. STRASSER, supra note 12, at 150. 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
24. Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement Rule for 
Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2010). 
25. James V. Corbelli, Note, Tower of Power: South Dakota v. Dole and the Strength of the Spending 
Power, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1988). 
26. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 53 (1936).  At issue in Butler was whether the AAA could 
levy processing taxes against agricultural commodities.  Id. at 55.  The AAA also provided that money 
raised from the processing tax could be used by the Secretary of Agriculture for various expenditures, 
including expanding markets, providing tax refunds, and removing surplus agricultural products.  Id. at 
56. 
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agricultural products was allowable under the Spending Clause.27  The 
Court further determined that because Congress did not have direct power 
to enforce commands on farmers, it could not ―indirectly accomplish those 
ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance.‖28  In considering the 
constitutionality of the AAA, the Court found it necessary to consider 
interpretations of the Spending Clause put forth by two Framers—James 
Madison and Alexander Hamilton.29  Madison believed Congress‘ spending 
power ―must be confined to the enumerated legislative fields committed to 
the Congress . . . Hamilton, on the other hand, maintained the clause . . . [is] 
limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the 
general welfare of the United States‖30 and, thus, not constrained by the 
enumerated powers of Congress listed in Article I.  Accordingly, the Court 
adopted the Hamiltonian view of the Spending Clause.31 
Forty-one years later, the Court ―confirmed Butler‘s broad vision of the 
federal spending power.‖32  In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court considered 
the constitutionality of a federal statute that directed the Secretary of 
Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funding from 
states that did not change their minimum drinking age to twenty-one.33  The 
Court ruled that the statute was ―within constitutional bounds even [though] 
Congress [could] not regulate drinking ages directly.‖34  The Dole Court 
identified four limitations on Congress‘ power under the Spending Clause: 
(1) the power must be exercised for the general welfare; (2) Congress must 
fashion conditions on states‘ receipt of federal money unambiguously so 
that states can knowingly choose whether or not to accept the money; (3) 
conditions on federal grants must be germane to the purpose served by the 
 
27. Id. at 62. 
28. Id. at 74. 
29. See id. at 65–66. 
30. Id. (alteration in original). 
31. Id. at 66.  However, the Court‘s discussion of the two competing views on the Spending Clause was 
dicta because of its decision to hold the AAA unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment.  
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1927 (1995).  
Ironically, even though the Court gave its unanimous approval to Hamilton‘s interpretation of the 
Spending Clause, it found the AAA unconstitutional in a manner that ―seemed logically consistent only 
with Madison‘s approach.‖  Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1112; see also David E. Engdahl, The Spending 
Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1994). 
However, the majority Justices in United States v. Butler, the 1936 case that first 
explicitly endorsed Hamilton‘s view, manifestly did not [understand Hamilton‘s view] . . 
. . [T]hey declared that Hamilton had it right but so misunderstood him that they actually 
decided the case according to the contrary, restrictive Madisonian view. 
Id. 
32. Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Funding Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole 
Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163, 168 (2001). 
33. 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987). 
34. Id. at 206 (alterations in original). 
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national programs; and (4) ―other constitutional provisions may provide an 
independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds‖35  The Court also 
suggested a fifth limitation: Congress cannot set a condition that coerces 
states into complying.36  Since Dole, the Court has never found a spending 
condition unconstitutional because it is barred by another constitutional 
provision.37 
III. RULING DOMA UNCONSTITUTIONAL: AN OVERVIEW OF JUDGE 
TOURO‘S OPINION IN MASSACHUSETTS 
A. Underlying Facts Involved in Massachusetts 
On July 8, 2009, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (―Massachusetts‖) 
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts challenging the constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA 
as applied to Massachusetts.38  Specifically, Massachusetts alleged that 
―DOMA interferes with the Commonwealth‘s exclusive authority to 
determine and regulate the marital status of its citizens.‖39  Furthermore, 
Massachusetts argued that ―Section 3 of DOMA imposes conditions on the 
Commonwealth‘s participation in certain federally funded programs that 
require the Commonwealth to disregard marriages validly solemnized under 
Massachusetts law.‖40 
 
 
 
35. Id. at 207–08.  Dole is considered to be the ―leading case dealing with the constitutionality of 
conditional spending by Congress.‖  Earl M. Maltz, Sovereignty, Autonomy and Conditional Spending, 4 
CHAP. L. REV. 107, 108 (2001). 
36. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.  According to the Court, a grant becomes coercive when it ―pass[es] the point 
at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖  Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
548, 590 (1937)). 
37. See Angel D. Mitchell, Comment, Conditional Federal Funding to the States: The New Federalism 
Demands a Close Examination for Unconstitutional Conditions, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 161, 178 (1999); 
see also Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1162.  In 2003, the Court considered the constitutionality of the 
Children‘s Internet Protection Act (―CIPA‖), which required public libraries to adopt a policy of using 
Internet filters as a condition of receiving federal funding.  United States v. Am. Library Ass‘n, 539 U.S. 
194, 201 (2003).  Specifically, the Court considered whether the conditions set forth in CIPA would 
require public libraries to violate the First Amendment in order to receive federal funding.  Id. at 203.  
The Court determined that CIPA did not impose an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal 
funding by public libraries because ―‗when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a 
program it is entitled to definite the limits of that program.‘‖  Id. at 211 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
38. Complaint at 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. 
Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09–cv–11156–JLT). 
39. Id. at 2. 
40. Id. at 2–3. 
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In its Complaint, Massachusetts alleged that the federal definition of 
marriage contained in Section Three of DOMA affects two major programs 
operated by the Commonwealth.  First, Massachusetts argued the definition 
of marriage set forth in DOMA affected the commonwealth‘s 
administration of its Medicaid program known as MassHealth.41  
MassHealth is ―jointly funded by the federal government and the 
Commonwealth‖ but is ―administered solely by Massachusetts.‖42  After 
Massachusetts began recognizing same-sex marriages,43 the Federal 
Government informed Massachusetts that ―it must apply the federal 
definition of marriage, as provided in DOMA, when assessing eligibility for 
Medicaid benefits.‖44  Currently, Massachusetts is required to cover the 
entire cost of MassHealth coverage provided to those individuals in same-
sex marriages who, but for DOMA, would qualify for Medicaid benefits but 
are still covered by MassHealth.45  Overall, Massachusetts alleged that 
about $2.37 million in federal funding is unavailable for MassHealth costs 
because of DOMA.46  According to Massachusetts: 
DOMA creates an unconstitutional dilemma . . . by requiring MassHealth to 
choose between . . . violating the Equal Protection Clause . . . by applying 
DOMA‘s federal definition of marriage in order to receive federal funding and . 
. . losing [federal funding participation] for otherwise eligible individuals and 
risking enforcement for non-compliance . . . if MassHealth continues to treat all 
married individuals equally in assessing . . . eligibility.47 
Second, Massachusetts alleged that DOMA‘s federal definition of 
marriage affects the ―operations of veterans‘ cemeteries at Agawam and 
Winchendon, Massachusetts, by the Massachusetts Department of Veterans 
Services (―DVS‖).‖48  Only veterans, their spouses, and their children are 
eligible for burial at these two cemeteries.49  The two cemeteries have been 
maintained and improved through the receipt of federal funding provided 
by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (―VA‖).50  After 
Massachusetts began to recognize same-sex marriages, the VA informed 
Massachusetts that it would be entitled to recapture federal funding 
provided to DVS if Massachusetts should decide to bury the same-sex 
 
41. See id. at 14–15. 
42. Id. at 14. 
43. See generally Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that 
barring recognition of same-sex civil marriage violates the Massachusetts Constitution). 
44. Complaint, supra note 38, at 16. 
45. Id. at 17. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 18 (alteration in original). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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spouse of a veteran at the cemeteries.51  When Massachusetts filed its 
complaint, DVS had already pre-approved an application for burial 
submitted by a veteran and his non-independently eligible same-sex 
spouse.52  According to Massachusetts: 
DOMA creates an unconstitutional dilemma for the Commonwealth by 
requiring DVS to choose between . . . violating the Equal Protection Clause . . . 
by refusing burial of the same-sex spouse of Massachusetts veterans in a 
Massachusetts veterans‘ cemetery and  . . . risking enforcement for non-
compliance by the VA if DVS continues to apply the state definition of 
marriage in assessing eligibility for burial in a veterans‘ cemetery.53 
In its Complaint, Massachusetts alleged that Section Three of DOMA 
violates both the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause of the 
Constitution.54  Because of these alleged violations, Massachusetts sought 
both ―declaratory and injunctive relief for the narrow but critical purpose of 
enabling [the Commonwealth] to define marriage within its own 
boundaries.‖55 
B. Motion for Summary Judgment 
In arguing for summary judgment, Massachusetts challenged Section 
Three of DOMA under both the Tenth Amendment and the Spending 
Clause.56  Specifically, Massachusetts argued that DOMA violates the 
Spending Clause because Section Three is independently barred by the 
Equal Protection Clause and DOMA‘s treatment of same-sex marriages 
does not relate to the purposes served by MassHealth and the veterans‘ 
cemetery programs.57 
 
51. See id. at 20.  The only way that a same-sex spouse would be eligible for burial is if he or she was 
―independently eligible;‖ that is, if he or she was also a veteran.  See id. 
52. Id. at 21. 
53. Id. 
54. See id. at 22, 24.  For purposes of this Note, Massachusetts‘ argument that Section Three of DOMA 
violates the Tenth Amendment will not be analyzed. 
55. Id. at 3 (alteration in original). 
56. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss Complaint and in 
Support of Commonwealth‘s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of 
Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT) [hereinafter 
Memorandum of Law]. 
57. See generally id. at 22–39.  Included in this argument is Massachusetts‘ claim that the court should 
apply ―heightened scrutiny‖ to classifications based on sexual orientation.  See id. at 31–36.  In Gill v. 
Office of Personnel Management, Judge Tauro determined that DOMA does not even meet the ―highly 
deferential rational basis test.‖  699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010).  Therefore, this Note will not 
address Massachusetts‘ argument that a heightened standard of review is necessary. 
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1. DOMA Requires Massachusetts to Violate the Equal Protection Clause 
As stated previously, Congress‘ power to impose spending conditions 
upon the states is not absolute because spending conditions may not 
independently violate another provision of the Constitution.58  
Massachusetts contended that ―[t]he fact that [it] has chosen to sacrifice 
federal funding by violating the terms of federal programs, rather than 
violate the Constitution, reinforces the fact that DOMA conditions federal 
spending on a constitutional violation.‖59  Specifically, Massachusetts 
claimed that Section Three of DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause 
because it upsets the previous status quo of ―federal incorporation of state 
marital status determinations,‖ because it ―permanently denies same-sex 
married couples [all] federal marriage-based . . . benefit[s], because it 
actually makes administration of relevant federal programs more difficult, 
and because DOMA was enacted based on animus against homosexuals.60 
2. DOMA‘s Treatment of Same-Sex Marriages Has No Relation to the 
Purposes Served by MassHealth and the Veterans‘ Cemetery Programs 
Additionally, Congress‘ power to impose spending conditions upon the 
states is not absolute because any conditions imposed must be sufficiently 
related to the specific purpose(s) of the federal spending.61  According to 
Massachusetts, Medicaid‘s purpose is to provide medical coverage for 
individuals with low incomes, yet DOMA undermines this purpose by 
requiring MassHealth to treat ―married individuals in same-sex couples as 
single‖ and therefore requiring ―coverage of individuals in high-income 
families.‖62  Similarly, the State Cemetery Grants Program provides burial 
sites for veterans and their spouses, yet ―DOMA precludes DVS from  
 
 
 
58. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987). 
59. Memorandum of Law, supra note 56, at 25 (alteration in original). 
60. Id. at 27–29 (alteration in original).  But see Consolidated Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Further Support of Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss and In Opposition to Plaintiff‘s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 14 n.5, Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-11156-
JLT) [hereinafter Consolidated Memorandum] (arguing that DOMA is consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause because, inter alia, Congress had a legitimate interest in preserving consistency in 
distributing federal benefits based on marital status). 
61. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (noting that 
conditions Congress attaches to federal funds given to states need to ―bear some relationship to the 
purpose of the federal spending; otherwise, of course, the spending power could render academic the 
Constitution‘s other grants and limits of federal authority‖). 
62. Memorandum of Law, supra note 56, at 37. 
  
2011] TILL DEATH (OR DOMA) DOES US PART 621 
burying same-sex spouses in its cemeteries.‖63  Overall, Massachusetts 
claimed that pursuant to DOMA, public funds were being allocated in 
discriminatory ways unrelated to the purposes of the federal programs.64 
C. Judge Tauro‘s Opinion- DOMA Violates the Spending Clause 
Judge Tauro granted Massachusetts‘ motion for summary judgment on 
July 8, 2010, exactly one year after Massachusetts filed its Complaint.65  In 
determining that Congress exceeded the scope of its power under the 
Spending Clause by enacting DOMA, Judge Tauro recognized that all 
federal laws must be based on one or more enumerated powers because 
Congress‘ powers are limited.66  Under the Spending Clause, Judge Tauro 
reasoned, Congress has broad, but not unlimited, power to condition states‘ 
receipt of federal moneys.67  With these principles in mind, Judge Tauro 
addressed Massachusetts‘ contention for why DOMA ―impermissibly 
conditions the receipt of federal funding on the state‘s violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause . . . by requiring that the state deny certain 
marriage-based benefits to same-sex married couples.‖68 
Judge Tauro first addressed Massachusetts‘ argument that DOMA is 
unconstitutional because it conditions the receipt of federal funding on a 
state‘s violation of the Equal Protection Clause by requiring states to deny 
benefits based on marital status to same-sex couples validly married under 
state law.69  Relying on his decision in Massachusetts‘ companion case of 
Gill v. Office of Personnel Management,70 Judge Tauro determined that 
―DOMA plainly conditions the receipt of federal funding on the denial of 
marriage-based benefits to same-sex married couples, though the same 
benefits are provided to similarly-situated heterosexual couples.‖71  
 
63. Id. 
64. See id. at 38.  But see Consolidated Memorandum, supra note 60, at 6–8 (arguing that DOMA does 
not impose conditions on federal aid received by Massachusetts because eligibility limits placed on 
federal programs are per se germane to the purposes served by those programs). 
65. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 253 (D. Mass. 
2010). 
66. Id. at 246. 
67. Id. at 245–46. 
68. Id. at 248.  Because of his determination that ―DOMA imposes an unconstitutional condition on the 
receipt of federal funds,‖ Judge Tauro did not address the question of whether DOMA was germane to 
the ―specific purposes of Medicaid or the State Cemetery Grants Program.‖  Id. at 249. 
69. Id. 
70. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
71. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248.  Because Judge Tauro ruled in Gill that DOMA fails to pass 
the rational basis test, see Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d. at 387, he found that analysis equally applicable in 
Massachusetts to determine that DOMA conditions receipt of federal moneys by the states on states‘ 
violations of the Equal Protection Clause, see Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248. 
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Therefore, because DOMA imposes an unconstitutional condition on states‘ 
receipt of federal funding, Congress exceeded the scope of its Spending 
Clause power by ignoring established restrictions on this authority.72 
Judge Tauro explicitly relied on his opinion in Gill to determine that 
DOMA imposed an unconstitutional condition on states‘ receipt of federal 
funding.73  In Gill, the government specifically ―disavowed Congress‘s 
stated justifications for [DOMA].‖74  Instead, the government claimed that 
the Constitution allowed Congress to enact DOMA to preserve the status 
quo and that DOMA was only an ―incremental response to a new social 
problem which Congress may constitutionally employ in the face of a 
changing socio-political landscape.‖75  Overall, Judge Tauro determined 
these two asserted justifications failed to fulfill the deferential rational basis 
test.76 
Regarding the government‘s first assertion—that the Constitution 
permitted Congress to enact DOMA to preserve the status quo—Judge 
Tauro determined that this justification ―relie[d] on a conspicuous 
misconception of what the status quo was at the federal level in 1996‖ 
because before DOMA, the Federal Government recognized any marriage 
valid under state law for federal purposes.77  Furthermore, even if one 
assumes that DOMA succeeded in preserving the federal status quo, this 
assumption merely describes what DOMA does instead of providing a 
justification.78 
Judge Tauro also rejected the government‘s other assertion that DOMA 
is only an incremental response to a growing social problem.  Instead of 
providing incremental ―relief‖ DOMA constitutes a ―comprehensive sweep 
across the entire body of federal law‖ and it is impossible to believe that a 
desire for consistency provides a sufficient justification for its enactment.79  
As Judge Tauro stated, ―Federal agencies are not burdened with the 
administrative task of implementing changing state marriage laws—that is a 
job for the states themselves.  Rather, federal agencies merely distribute 
federal marriage-based benefits to those couples that have already obtained 
state-sanctioned marriage licenses.‖80  Therefore, according to Judge 
 
72. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248–49. 
73. Id. at 248. 
74. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (alteration in original). 
75. Id. at 390. 
76. See id. at 387, 390. 
77. Id. at 393. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 395. 
80. Id. 
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Tauro‘s conclusion that ―irrational prejudice‖ was the only motivation for 
distinguishing between opposite-sex and same-sex marriages, Section Three 
of DOMA as applied to Massachusetts violated the ―equal protection 
principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment.‖81 
On October 12, 2010, the government filed a notice of appeal of Judge 
Tauro‘s opinion in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts.82  The appeal will be heard by the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit.83 
IV. DOES SECTION THREE OF DOMA CLASSIFY OR COERCE?: A CALL FOR 
A NEW VIEW OF THE SPENDING CLAUSE IN THE WAKE OF MASSACHUSETTS 
As mentioned above, Judge Tauro determined that DOMA, through its 
definition that for federal purposes a marriage only exists between one man 
and one woman, induced Massachusetts to violate its citizens‘ equal 
protection rights in order to receive federal funding and therefore imposed 
an unconstitutional condition.84  In so determining, Judge Tauro relied on 
the Dole Court‘s conclusion that Congress may not enact legislation under 
the Spending Clause that imposes unconstitutional conditions on the receipt 
of federal funding.85  Since the Court‘s decision twenty-three years ago in 
Dole, many commentators have suggested that it is time for the Court to 
reconsider its interpretation of the Spending Clause, particularly in the wake 
of the Court‘s decisions in New York v. United States86 and Printz v. United 
States.87  After all, if Congress cannot directly commandeer states and state 
officials to execute federal laws, why should Congress be able to indirectly 
commandeer states through Spending Clause legislation?88  According to 
 
81. Id. at 397.  Of course, the Fifth Amendment lacks an Equal Protection Clause like the one included 
in the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, the Supreme Court has noted that ―the concepts of equal 
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually 
exclusive.‖  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
82. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), 
appeal docketed, No. 10–2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 2010). 
83. Id. 
84. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248–49. 
85. Id. at 249.  See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987). 
86. See generally 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that monetary and access incentives provided to 
states through the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act were constitutional but that the Act‘s ―take-
title‖ provision, which required states to either accept ownership of their radioactive waste or enact 
regulations according to Congress‘ instructions, violated the Tenth Amendment). 
87. See generally 521 U.S. 898, 934–35 (1997) (holding that Congress could not commandeer state 
officers to execute Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act by requiring them to conduct background 
checks on prospective handgun purchasers). 
88. See Whitten, supra note 5, at 458 (arguing that Congress‘ use of ―back-door commandeering‖ 
through Spending Clause legislation is similar to the ―coercive congressional regulation condemned in 
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some commentators, there are actually two types of conditions when 
referring to constitutional limitations on federal spending—classifying 
conditions and coercive conditions.89 This Part examines Section Three of 
DOMA as both a classifying and coercive condition and determines that if 
the Court were to adopt this new view of the Spending Clause, the 
condition presented by DOMA would still be unconstitutional. 
Of the two types of conditions—classifying and coercive—the latter 
―tends to implicate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions‖ while the 
former does not.90  Professor Albert Rosenthal refers to classifying 
conditions as those that specify the ―eligible recipients of the federal grant 
in terms at least partly beyond their control;‖ conversely, coercive 
conditions are those that have ―the likely effect (and usually the purpose as 
well) of influencing [recipients‘] conduct.‖91  As mentioned before, DOMA 
provides that when determining the meaning of any federal statute or 
regulation, the word ―marriage‖ means ―only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife,‖ and the word ―spouse‖ is used 
to denote ―only [ ] a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.‖92 
A. DOMA Unconstitutionally Classifies Based on Sexual Orientation 
At first glance, it appears that Section Three of DOMA only sets forth a 
classifying condition to be applied to all statutes implicating federal 
funding93—in other words, for those funding statutes that consider marital 
or spousal status, only those marriages between a man and wife and those 
spouses who are opposite-sex are to be considered.  Rosenthal argues that 
―[a]ny constitutional difficulties that arise with [classifying conditions] will 
generally relate to questions of equal protection.‖94  Here, DOMA‘s federal 
definition of marriage in Section Three does give rise to equal protection 
issues because it directly distinguishes between heterosexual and 
homosexual marriages.95  Therefore, the Court should consider whether this  
 
 
New York and Printz‖). 
89. E.g., Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1114. 
90. Id. at 1116.  But cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1496 (1989) (―Unconstitutional conditions inherently classify potential beneficiaries into two groups: 
those who comply with the condition and thereby get better treatment, and those who do not.‖). 
91. Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1114 (alteration in original). 
92. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (alteration in original). 
93. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). 
94. Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1116 (alteration in original). 
95. See Defense of Marriage Act, § 3(a), 110 Stat. at 2419. 
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classifying condition satisfies equal protection principles; if not, then it 
should serve as an independent constitutional bar to Congress‘ Spending 
Clause power. 
Anytime an equal protection violation is alleged, the Court must 
determine which standard of review to apply to the classification.  
According to Judge Tauro, Section Three of DOMA ―fails to pass 
constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational basis test.‖96  
Furthermore, he was ―convinced that ‗there exists no fairly conceivable set 
of facts that could ground a rational relationship‘ between DOMA and a 
legitimate government objective.‖97  If the Court eventually grants certiorari 
to Massachusetts and Gill, it will need to determine which standard of 
review to apply to the classification set forth in Section Three of DOMA.  
The Court has only considered an equal protection challenge to a 
classification based on sexual orientation once, when it considered the 
constitutionality of ―Amendment 2‖ to Colorado‘s state constitution.98  
Amendment 2 repealed all ordinances prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation and also ―prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or 
judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect 
[homosexuals].‖99  The Court ruled that Amendment 2 failed to meet even 
the rational basis test, stating: 
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.  First, the 
amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated 
disability on a single named group, an exceptional and . . . invalid form of 
legislation.  Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons 
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but an animus 
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state 
interests.100 
 
 
 
96. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010). 
97. Id. (quoting Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2005)) (internal citation omitted). 
98. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).  In 2003, the Court was presented with an equal 
protection challenge to a ―Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in 
certain intimate conduct.‖  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).  However, the Court declined 
to address the equal protection argument because it determined the issue should be resolved with 
reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 564.  Notably, in her 
concurrence, Justice O‘Connor argued that the Texas statute was unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because ―[a] law branding one class of persons as 
criminal based solely on the State‘s moral disapproval of that class . . . runs contrary to the values of the 
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of review.‖  Id. at 585 (O‘Connor, J., 
concurring). 
99. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (alteration in original). 
100. Id. at 632 (emphasis added). 
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Here, the definition of marriage codified in Section Three of DOMA is a 
classifying condition based on sexual orientation because it classifies 
between heterosexual and homosexual marriages.101  Furthermore, as 
discussed above, the legislative history seems to suggest that the primary 
reason Congress enacted DOMA was because of animus toward 
homosexuals.102  Section Three of DOMA is analogous to Colorado‘s 
Amendment 2 at issue in Romer—which the Romer Court found failed even 
the deferential rational basis test.103  Both provisions specifically single out 
a specific group of people—homosexuals—and essentially impose ―a broad 
and undifferentiated disability.‖104  In Romer, Colorado‘s Amendment 2 left 
homosexuals open to discrimination on any basis with no remedy to provide 
recourse.105  Similarly, Section Three of DOMA forecloses homosexuals in 
same-sex marriages from receiving federal benefits conditioned on marital 
status, even if those same-sex marriages are valid under state law.106 
Therefore, if the Court chooses to uphold Judge Tauro‘s application of the 
rational basis test, it could directly rely on its decision in Romer for support. 
However, two federal courts of appeals have suggested that the Court 
should apply a heightened standard of review to classifications involving 
sexual orientation.107  Furthermore, there are two different approaches to 
applying strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis.  First, a court can 
determine that classifications discriminating based on sexual orientation are 
―suspect‖ and that homosexuals constitute a ―suspect class.‖108  If the Court 
chooses to apply strict scrutiny in this fashion to Section Three of DOMA, 
it would need to determine whether homosexuals constitute a class that has 
experienced a history of ―purposeful unequal treatment.‖109  At least two 
lower courts have already recognized that homosexuals as a group have 
 
101. See Whitten, supra note 5, at 440–41. 
102. See supra Part II.A. 
103. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 624–25. 
106. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified 
as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). 
107. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (―All classifications 
based on sexual orientation appear suspect, as the evidence shows that California would rarely, if ever, 
have a reason to categorize individuals based on their sexual orientation.  Here, however, strict scrutiny 
is unnecessary.  Proposition 8 fails to survive even rational basis review.‖); cf. Witt v. Dep‘t of the Air 
Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821–22 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that heightened scrutiny should apply to 
substantive due process claims involving the military‘s ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ policy). 
108. Witt, 527 F.3d at 824 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  But see HOWARD 
BALL, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INTIMATE LIVES OF AMERICANS 61 (2002) (arguing that 
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class for which is needed a compelling state interest to uphold a 
statute classifying on the basis of sexual orientation). 
109. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). 
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experienced discrimination and prejudice solely because of their sexual 
orientation.110  Second, ―[c]lassifications that impinge on a fundamental 
right are subject to strict scrutiny when challenged as a violation of equal 
protection.‖111  In Gill, the plaintiffs argued for strict scrutiny because 
―DOMA burdens Plaintiffs‘ fundamental right to maintain the integrity of 
their existing family relationships.‖112  They reasoned that DOMA violates 
their rights to maintain the integrity of their marriages—and the Court has 
already held that marriage is a fundamental right.113  Therefore, if the Court 
chooses to apply strict scrutiny in this fashion, it is highly likely the Court 
will uphold Judge Tauro‘s decision that Section Three of DOMA is 
unconstitutional under the equal protection principles of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
In sum, if the Court views the federal definition of marriage set forth in 
Section Three of DOMA as a classifying condition, it is likely to find it 
violates equal protection principles whether rational basis, heightened 
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny is applied.  If the Court chooses to apply rational 
basis, it can defer to the findings of two federal district courts.114  Similarly, 
if it chooses heightened or strict scrutiny, it can defer to the findings of two 
lower courts.115  Accordingly, finding a violation of equal protection 
principles automatically triggers Dole‘s fourth limitation on Congress‘ 
Spending Clause power—Congress cannot enact spending legislation when 
another constitutional provision provides an ―independent bar to the 
conditional grant of federal [money].116  Therefore, when DOMA‘s federal 
definition of marriage is viewed as a classifying condition, it presents a 
―constitutional difficulty‖ based on equal protection and therefore is beyond 
Congress‘ power to enact under the Spending Clause.117 
 
110. Witt, 527 F.3d at 824–25 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―Suffice it to say 
that homosexuals have ―experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment [and] been subjected to 
unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.‖ 
(quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313))  (internal quotation marks omitted); Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996 
(―The evidence at trial shows that gays and lesbians experience discrimination based on unfounded 
stereotypes and prejudices specific to sexual orientation.‖). 
111. Witt, 527 F.3d at 825 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338–39 (1972)). 
112. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010). 
113. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (The ―freedom to marry has long been recognized as 
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.‖).  But see 
BALL, supra note 108, at 61 (arguing that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage). 
114. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997; Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387. 
115. Witt, 527 F.3d at 824–26 (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Perry, 704 F. Supp. 
2d at 997. 
116. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
117. See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1116. 
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B. DOMA‘s Definition of Marriage Impermissibly Coerces States To 
Accept Federal Grants 
Even though the argument above establishes that Section Three of 
DOMA presents an unconstitutional classifying condition, it can also be 
labeled as a coercive condition because it ―has the likely effect . . . of 
influencing their conduct, with the promised carrot of federal funds for 
those who avoid the type of activity that Congress seeks to discourage or 
the threatened stick of denial of funds for those who refuse.‖118  Therefore, 
because the Court could determine that Section Three of DOMA does not 
violate equal protection principles under whichever standard of review the 
Court chooses, it is necessary to determine whether DOMA is the 
equivalent of an unconstitutional coercive condition. 
1. The Problems of Current Spending Clause Jurisprudence Concerning 
Coercion 
Under current Spending Clause jurisprudence, ―Congress can remain 
within the limits of the spending power simply by conditioning the receipt 
of federal grants on the state‘s compliance with federal mandates.  A 
condition . . . cannot actually coerce a state, which always has the 
opportunity to decline the benefit and avoid the accompanying federal 
regulation.‖119  However, Dole suggests that when analyzing federal 
spending legislation, coercion occurs when states simply cannot afford to 
―resist the lure of federal funding.‖120  Furthermore, the Court has indicated 
that a determination of whether coercion exists turns on the amount of 
federal grant money available.121  Realistically, the observation that states 
always have the opportunity to decline federal funding can ―readily be 
rejected if the condition is deemed oppressive‖ because ―the budgets of 
state and local governments [are] now so greatly dependent on federal 
money.‖122  Therefore, courts should not just defer to Congress‘ extensive 
 
118. Id. at 1114. 
119. Donald J. Mizerk, Note, The Coercion Test and Conditional Federal Grants to the States, 40 
VAND. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (1987); see also Derek C. Araujo, A Queer Alliance: Gay Marriage and the 
New Federalism, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 200, 240 (2006) (―A state that accepts federal funds to 
which Congress has attached conditions might be thought to offer its consent to congressional 
regulation.  After all, the state retains the ability to make a political decision not to accept the funds.‖); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 103 (2001) (―The use of the 
spending power is different because states always retain a choice, unpleasant as it may be to give up the 
federal funds.‖). 
120. McConville, supra note 32, at 172. 
121. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987). 
122. Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 1162 (alteration in original); see also Araujo, supra note 119, at 243 
(―In practical terms, asking states to reject even small amounts of federal funding is often asking the 
impossible.‖). 
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spending power whenever funding represents an extensive source of state 
revenue; instead, courts must determine whether the condition at issue 
impermissibly coerces the states to comply.123 
Furthermore, current Spending Clause jurisprudence undermines 
federalism.124  Specifically, it causes reductions in ―states‘ responsiveness 
to the preferences of their inhabitants and . . . competition between states to 
become more attractive to inhabitants.‖125  The Dole Court‘s view of the 
Spending Clause negatively impacts federalism because it causes aggregate 
social welfare to decline.126  This broad interpretation of congressional 
spending authority provides Congress with the authority to drive the states 
toward a single nationwide policy and essentially ignore those states who 
adopt differing public policies.127  Therefore, when determining whether a 
specific federal spending condition impermissibly coerces the states, 
meaningful, judicially-enforceable limitations on the spending power are 
needed to ―provide[ ] ‗outlier‘ or ‗minority‘ states protection from federal 
homogenization in areas in which they deviate from the national norm, 
whether that deviation is to the left or right of the political center.‖128 
2. A New Test to Determine When a Funding Condition is 
Unconstitutionally Coercive 
To combat these effects, several commentators have suggested variations 
on a new test to determine if a condition attached to federal funding is 
 
123. See Mitchell, supra note 37, at 184. 
124. See Douglas A. Wick, Note, Rethinking Conditional Federal Grants and the Independent 
Constitutional Bar Test, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (2010). 
125. Id. 
126. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon 
its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 
471 (2003).  Baker and Berman believe that ―in the absence of a nationwide consensus, permitting state-
by-state variation will almost always satisfy more people than would the imposition of a uniform 
national policy.‖  Id. 
127. Id. at 472. 
128. Id. at 470.  But see Baker, supra note 31, at 1951 (―Of course, increased diversity among the states 
is not always a good thing.  Some states, for example, might have laws expressing a moral preference 
that a majority of Americas consider unacceptable, and which a conditional offer of federal funds might 
persuade these states to repeal.‖).  According to Baker‘s argument, one could argue that because five 
states (Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont) and the District of Columbia 
recognize same-sex marriage, Congress enacted DOMA and its federal definition of marriage in order to 
persuade these jurisdictions to repeal their laws by conditioning the receipt of federal funding on the 
application of this definition of marriage.  See generally HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, MARRIAGE 
EQUALITY AND OTHER RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION LAWS (2010), available at 
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (identifying that Connecticut, 
the District of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples). 
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impermissibly coercive and therefore violates the Constitution.129  This new 
test states that any offers of federal funding to the states that would regulate 
them in ways that Congress cannot directly legislate through its enumerated 
powers would be presumed invalid.130  This version of the unconstitutional 
conditions test would only apply when analyzing funding the government is 
permitted to distribute, not when analyzing those benefits the government is 
compelled to provide.131  Essentially, a court considering whether a 
condition attached to a grant of federal money is coercive must compare 
that condition to the Constitution.132  If the action required by the condition 
―would be unconstitutional when undertaken directly by the federal 
government,‖ it is presumed to violate the independent constitutional 
provision limitation established by the Dole Court.133  According to 
Professor Baker, this presumption can be overcome if the government 
sufficiently shows that the condition constitutes ―reimbursement spending‖ 
rather than ―regulatory spending.‖134  Finally, any conditional grants that 
burden either individual or states‘ rights must be analyzed with ―exacting 
judicial scrutiny.‖135 
3. Applying the New Test to Section Three of DOMA 
When considering Section Three of DOMA under this new test, a court 
must determine whether DOMA‘s definition of marriage applies to funding 
―the government is permitted… not compelled,‖ to distribute.136  
Massachusetts argued that Section Three of DOMA, as applied to 38 U.S.C. 
 
129. See Baker, supra note 31, at 1933. 
130. See id. at 1962–63; Corbelli, supra note 25, at 1118, 1121; Wick, supra note 124, at 1362. 
131. Sullivan, supra note 90, at 1422.  However, the reality is that most federal benefits are permissive 
under the current scheme.  Id. 
132. Wick, supra note 124, at 1379. 
133. Id. 
134. Baker, supra note 31, at 1963. 
―Reimbursement spending‖ legislation specifies the purpose for which the states are to 
spend the offered federal funds and simply reimburses the states . . . for their 
expenditures . . . .  Most ―regulatory spending‖ legislation thus includes a simple 
spending component which, if enacted in isolation, would be unproblematic under the 
proposed test. 
Id. 
135. Wick, supra note 124, at 1372; see also Baker, supra note 31, at 1923 (―[T]he critical variable is 
whether the condition attached to the offered funds, taken alone, impinges on a constitutional right of the 
claimant.  Conditions that do not affect the claimant‘s exercise of a constitutional right are 
unproblematic; conditions that do, however, may or may not be.‖); cf. Sullivan, supra note 90, at 1419 
(discussing how the ―central challenge‖ of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is ―explain[ing] why 
conditions that ‗indirectly‘ pressure preferred liberties should be as suspect as ‗direct burdens‘ imposed 
on those same rights‖).  Sullivan also believes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine only protects 
those rights depending on the right-holder‘s exercise of some autonomous choice, and only then to those 
rights that are recognized and usually subject to strict scrutiny.  Id. at 1426. 
136. See Sullivan, supra note 90, at 1422. 
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§ 2408 (the State Cemetery Grants Program (―Program‖)), required 
Massachusetts to violate equal protection principles in order to receive 
federal funding.137  Under the Program, ―the Secretary [of the VA] may 
make a grant to any State for . . . establishing, expanding, or improving a 
veteran‘s cemetery owned by the State‖ and for ―operating and maintain 
such a cemetery.‖138  A plain reading of this statute suggests that a state is 
not obligated to accept this funding; rather, receiving federal funding is 
discretionary because the Secretary ―may‖ provide grants to any state 
applying under the program.139  This argument would also apply to 
Massachusetts‘ contention that DOMA, as applied to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et 
seq. (―the Medicaid statute‖ or ―Medicaid‖), requires Massachusetts to 
violate equal protection principles by distinguishing between individuals in 
same-sex marriages and individuals in opposite-sex marriages for Medicaid 
eligibility determinations.140  According to the Medicaid statute, ―sums 
made available under this section shall be used for making payments to 
States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary [of Health 
and Human Services (―HHS‖)], State plans for medical assistance.‖141  
Looking at the plain language of the Medicaid statute, it appears that 
Medicaid is a voluntary program because states must choose to submit 
plans and have them approved by the Secretary of HHS before receiving 
federal funding.142  Therefore, Section Three of DOMA does meet the first 
part of the test for coercion. 
Second, a court must consider whether Section Three of DOMA, when 
applied to federal spending statutes, purports to ―regulate the states in ways 
that Congress could not directly mandate.‖143  Here, Section Three does 
―not actually [direct] the states how to define ‗marriage‘ and ‗spouse‘‖; 
instead, Congress is coercing the states to adopt similar definitions to 
continue to receive federal funding conditioned on marital status.144  
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However, the ―whole subject of domestic relations of husband and wife, 
parent and child, belongs to the law of the states, and not to the law of the 
United States.‖145  When determining who can receive federal benefits 
under a federal statute, the federal government will defer to state laws 
regarding domestic relations ―unless Congress clearly mandates 
otherwise.‖146  Congress has no enumerated power to direct the states to 
recognize certain types of marriages as valid and others as invalid;147 
therefore, Section Three of DOMA presumptively violates the independent 
constitutional bar limitation on federal funding propounded by the Dole 
Court. 
Finally, a court must consider whether this presumption of 
unconstitutional coercion can be rebutted by a showing that the condition 
constitutes ―reimbursement spending‖ rather than ―regulatory spending.‖148  
Again, reimbursement spending only ―specifies the purpose for which the 
states are to spend the offered federal funds and simply reimburses the 
states … for their expenditures.‖149  When considering whether Section 
Three of DOMA specifies the purpose for which the funds are to be used, a 
court must consider the substantive federal statute authorizing the federal 
funding.  Under the State Cemetery Grants Program, the VA can provide 
grants for states to use to maintain, expand, and construct veterans‘ 
cemeteries if the states submit applications for this grant money.150  
Congress has not specifically specified how the states are to use the grant 
money to maintain these cemeteries; however, to qualify for a grant a state 
must operate the cemetery for veterans, veterans‘ spouses, and minor and 
disabled adult children.151  Therefore, the State Cemetery Grants Program 
appears to set only a general purpose for the use of the funds. However, it 
does not simply reimburse the states for their expenditures because states 
submit plans to receive grant money, and any money not used within three 
years can be recovered by the United States.152  Therefore, a showing of 
reimbursement spending as applied to the State Cemetery Grants Program 
should not rebut Section Three of DOMA. 
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Determining whether Section Three of DOMA as applied to MassHealth 
sets a reimbursement spending condition rather than a regulatory spending 
condition requires a bit more analysis.  MassHealth is jointly funded by 
Massachusetts and the Federal Government but is administered exclusively 
by Massachusetts.153  Massachusetts has admitted that ―[i]n general, the 
federal government reimburses half of the qualifying health benefits paid 
out by MassHealth.‖154  Therefore, from this concession it appears that a 
finding of coercion would be rebutted.  However, because the Federal 
Government has specifically informed MassHealth that it must apply 
DOMA‘s definition of marriage when determining eligibility for Medicaid 
benefits and because this mandate has caused Massachusetts not to receive 
about $2.37 million in federal funding,155 a court should still consider 
whether this is reimbursement or regulatory spending. 
According to the Medicaid statute, the purpose of providing funds to 
those states that have submitted plans for medical assistance is to enable 
those states to provide medical assistance to eligible individuals who do not 
have the income or resources to cover the costs of necessary medical 
services.156  When considering the eligibility of a married individual, 
MassHealth combines the assets and income of that individual with those of 
his or her spouse.157  Under federal law, Massachusetts must assess married 
individuals in same-sex relationships as though they were single rather than 
married, yet MassHealth continues to make eligibility determinations 
without regard to whether the marriage is between two individuals of the 
same sex or two of different sexes.158  Therefore, while the purpose of 
Medicaid is to enable states to assist those individuals who do not have 
sufficient resources to meet medical costs,159 Congress is not meeting that 
purpose by conditioning states‘ receipt of funding for medical assistance 
programs on the acceptance of DOMA‘s definition of marriage.  
Furthermore, while the Federal Government does reimburse half of the 
benefits paid by MassHealth,160 it does not reimburse Massachusetts for 
those benefits paid to qualifying individuals who happen to be married to a  
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spouse of the same sex.161  Based on these observations, Section Three of 
DOMA, as applied to Medicaid benefits, should be classified as an 
unconstitutional coercive condition. 
C. Distinguishing Congressional Regulation of Polygamy from 
Congressional Regulation of Same-Sex Marriage Through DOMA 
Supporters of the constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA may argue 
that there is no difference between Congress attempting to regulate state 
recognition of same-sex marriage and Congress‘ many attempts to regulate 
and prohibit the practice of polygamy in the Western territories in the 
nineteenth century.162  In his opinion in Massachusetts, Judge Tauro failed 
to discuss the congressional history regarding the regulation of polygamy 
and how this serves as one instance of Congress attempting to trump the 
states‘ abilities to define marriage for themselves.163  Therefore, because the 
Court could conceivably determine that Congress‘ attempt to regulate same-
sex marriage through DOMA is permissible because of Congress‘ past 
regulation of polygamy, this Note analyzes how, even when compared to 
the regulation of polygamy, Section Three of DOMA still creates an 
unconstitutional coercive condition for the receipt of federal funding. 
Congress began to regulate the practice of polygamy in the nineteenth 
century as ―Mormon theology evolved‖ in the Western territories, 
especially Utah.164  In 1862, Congress enacted a law prohibiting the practice 
of polygamy in all U.S. territories.165  Twenty years later, Congress made 
cohabitation a crime and prohibited those individuals practicing polygamy 
from sitting on juries or holding office.166  Five years later, Congress 
enacted the Edmunds-Tucker Act, which mandated that plural wives testify 
against their husbands and dissolved the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints as a corporation to allow the Federal Government to seize church 
property.167  In 1878, the Court upheld the constitutionality of these anti-
polygamy laws when it ruled that Congress lacked the power under the Free 
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Exercise Clause to legislate concerning religious opinion and belief but is 
free to ―reach actions which were held in violation of social duties or 
subversive of good order.‖168  Finally, in order for Arizona, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Utah to gain statehood admission to the United States, 
Congress required that they enact anti-polygamy provisions within their 
state constitutions.169 
As previously mentioned, the Court has recognized that the field of law 
regulating domestic relations belongs to the states and not the Federal 
Government.170  Yet the multiple laws enacted by Congress during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries targeting practitioners of polygamy 
clearly demonstrate one major instance where Congress trumped the states‘ 
ability to define marriage.  Even though Congress did condition statehood 
for Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah on the inclusion of anti-
polygamy provisions in their state constitutions,171 this condition placed 
upon statehood can be distinguished from the unconstitutional coercive 
condition placed on states‘ receipt of federal money by Section Three of 
DOMA. 
First, polygamy and same-sex marriage, as institutions, ―are 
distinguishable because there are a number of social ills historically present 
in polygamy that are not present in same-sex marriages.‖172  Looking at the 
history of polygamous marriages in the United States reveals a ―pattern of 
underage wives.‖173  Usually, polygamous males ―‗marry [girls] between 
the ages of fourteen and sixteen.‘‖174  Sexual abuse and child molestation 
are often prevalent in polygamous households.175  Female children do not 
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receive the same level of education as male children receive, and females 
―are raised to believe that women are inferior to men.‖176  Also, many 
polygamous families are impoverished because polygamist wives often do 
not work outside the home and therefore ―the responsibility for family 
finances falls entirely on the patriarchs of the community.‖177  Finally, 
―polygamy undermine[s] the basic tenants of a monogamous heterosexual 
marriage‖—unity and partnership.178  None of these concerns are present in 
a marriage between two consenting individuals of the same sex.  Instead, a 
same-sex marriage, like a monogamous heterosexual marriage, ―remains 
focused on unity and partnership; that is, on the exclusive commitment of 
two individuals.‖179  Therefore, both the federal and state governments have 
a legitimate interest in prohibiting polygamy to protect women and children 
from being exploited through polygamous relationships. 
Second, the congressional regulation of polygamy should not be 
considered a coercive condition like the condition Section Three of DOMA 
places on states‘ receipt of federal spending should be.  As an initial matter, 
Congress can constitutionally make rules and regulations respecting all U.S. 
territories.180  Therefore, Congress could validly prohibit the practice of 
polygamy in the Western territories.  Conceivably, those territories that 
eventually became Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah actively 
sought admission to the Union in order to enjoy whatever benefits of 
statehood the Constitution and laws of the United States provide.  
Therefore, an argument could be made that these territories that were 
reaching out to Congress for statehood could only do so by accepting the 
condition that their state constitutions contain anti-polygamy provisions. 
On the other hand, Section Three of DOMA‘s definition of marriage as 
being between one man and one woman conditions the states‘ receipt of 
federal funding in order to run federal programs such as Medicaid.181  For 
example, Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as a ―cooperative federal/state 
medical assistance program for the ‗worthy poor‘—public assistance 
recipients and the medically needy.‖182  Even though states had the choice 
of opting into Medicaid, they essentially had no choice ―if they wanted to 
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continue to take advantage of federal matching assistance‖ because the 
matching programs Medicaid replaced ended on December 31, 1969.183  
Medicaid is a classic example of congressional legislation enticing the 
states to opt into participating in federal programs to receive federal 
assistance—assistance that the states cannot afford to forego in today‘s 
society.  Therefore, unlike those territories which actively sought admission 
to the Union as states, the current nature of federal programs and federal 
benefits means that states essentially do not have a choice between 
accepting conditional federal funding or foregoing it and still attempting to 
provide the same level of assistance to their citizens.184 
According to Professor Rosenthal, state decisions regarding marriage and 
marital status are largely immune from governmental regulation, but he 
does acknowledge that certain decisions relating to marriage could alter 
states‘ receipt of federal funding.185  Rosenthal views any conditions based 
on marital status attached to the receipt of federal funding as classifying 
conditions instead of coercive conditions because ―the amounts of money at 
stake are not generally large enough to be decisive with respect to 
fundamental choices concerning personal and family life.‖186  However, 
Section Three of DOMA is an exception to this observation.  Because 
receipt of federal funding is attached to states‘ acceptance of DOMA‘s 
definition of marriage as between one man and one woman, Massachusetts 
has not been able to claim about $2.37 million in federal funding for 
MassHealth and faces a decision by the VA to recapture millions in federal 
grants should Massachusetts decide to bury a non-independently eligible 
same-sex spouse of a veteran in one of the two veterans‘ cemeteries.187 
In sum, Section Three of DOMA should be treated as both a classifying 
and coercive condition placed on federal funding and therefore is 
unconstitutional under both theories.  By classifying recipients of federal 
funding based on sexual orientation, states that recognize same-sex 
marriages must violate equal protection principles to continue to receive 
this funding.  Even if the Court were to determine, by applying either strict 
scrutiny or rational basis, that Section Three of DOMA does not violate 
equal protection principles, it still violates the Spending Clause because it 
impermissibly coerces states to abide by the federal definition of marriage 
as between one man and one woman in order to receive federal funding for 
programs such as Medicaid.  Supporters of DOMA may argue that 
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Congress was allowed to regulate the marriage relationship in the 
nineteenth century by prohibiting the practice of polygamy in the Western 
territories;188 however, the condition the federal definition of marriage 
places on states‘ receipt of federal funding provides states with less choice 
than the territories had because the states serve as conduits for federal 
programs and cannot adequately support their citizens without federal 
funding.  Therefore, under this proposed reformulation of Spending Clause 
jurisprudence, Section Three of DOMA unconstitutionally classifies and 
coerces. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under the law as articulated in Dole, Congress might exert financial pressure 
on the states to force them to conform state law to DOMA‘s definition of 
marriage.  Such a move might be entirely constitutional under the Supreme 
Court‘s reading of the Spending Clause, even though Congress may not meddle 
with the states‘ treatment of marriage through its enumerated power under the 
Commerce Clause.189 
Unfortunately, this statement describes exactly what Congress has 
attempted to persuade the states to do since the enactment of DOMA in 
1996.  According to the Dole Court‘s Spending Clause interpretation, 
Congress can attach any condition it wishes to states‘ receipt of federal 
funding as long as that condition is not independently barred by another 
constitutional provision.190  Currently, Congress can attempt to create a 
single nationwide policy by passing legislation authorizing federal funding 
only for states complying with that policy.191  Therefore, current Spending 
Clause jurisprudence defies federalism because Congress can essentially 
ignore those states with differing public policies. 
 The Supreme Court is almost certain to grant certiorari to 
Massachusetts and Gill because of Judge Tauro‘s determination that 
Section Three of DOMA, as applied to Massachusetts, exceeded Congress‘ 
power under the Spending Clause,192 the Tenth Amendment,193 and the 
―equal protection principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment.‖ 194  This 
would present the Court with an opportunity to reformulate its Spending 
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Clause jurisprudence so that Congress cannot continue to indirectly 
commandeer states through spending legislation when it cannot directly 
commandeer states and state officials to execute federal laws.195  Under a 
reformulation of the Spending Clause, a court would consider whether a 
condition attached to the receipt of federal funding is either an 
unconstitutional classifying condition or an unconstitutional coercive 
condition.196  Under this view, a court is highly likely to find that the 
definition of marriage as a union between one man and one woman as set 
forth in Section Three of DOMA is an unconstitutional classifying and 
coercive condition. 
 The Court last interpreted the Spending Clause in 1987—twenty-
three years ago.197  In the wake of decisions like New York and Printz that 
reaffirmed a commitment to federalism, it is high time for the Court to 
again address the Spending Clause.  If the Court affirms Judge Tauro‘s 
opinion and determines that Section Three of DOMA is unconstitutional 
under the Spending Clause, not only would the Court demonstrate a 
commitment to federalism by prohibiting Congress to use the ―carrot and 
stick‖ of money to influence states where it could not do so directly, but it 
would also demonstrate a commitment to equality for gay men and lesbians 
across America. 
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